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In Partnership with



NATO Transformation Seminar 2015

Washington, DC 24-26 March 2015

Next Steps in NATO's Transformation: To the Warsaw Summit and Beyond

WHITE PAPER

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NATO is confronting the most rapid negative change in its security environment since its founding, compelling Allies to refocus on collective defence in Europe and re-examine the relevance of NATO's strategy. While this effort started in advance of NATO's previous summit in Wales, the Alliance's latest adaptation has only just begun. The crises of today combined with long-term trends require both urgency to NATO's responses and a sustained commitment to its transformation. The July 2016 Warsaw Summit offers a compelling opportunity to significantly advance this adaptation.

The 2010 Strategic Concept was introduced in a different context: the Euro-Atlantic community was considered whole, free, and at peace. North Africa and the Middle East were of less significance to Allied security. NATO and Russia were working towards a cooperative and effective strategic partnership.

NATO's ability to adapt is proven by its 66 years of continued transformation. But three areas of change focus our attention toward the Warsaw Summit: adapting to hybrids threats, strengthening our technological edge, and improving our decision making processes.

As the Secretary General noted in his keynote address, "we do not have the luxury to choose between collective defence and crisis management. For the first time in NATO's history we have

NOTE: The following is a conceptual piece to encourage discussion. It is not official policy and does not necessarily reflect the views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

to do both at the same time.” These views were supported by SACT, who noted that we operate in a hardened security environment where state and non-state-actors may feel unconstrained by international law. Adversaries may trigger simultaneous and diverse crises using a hybrid form of warfare that challenges our planning, preparation and decision making processes. The solidarity of the Alliance and our forces may be challenged if our opponents are able to deploy increasingly advanced and available anti-access and area denial weapons.

Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is plagued by an interstate war on the Alliance’s border; Russia is threatening and intimidating its neighbours, including NATO allies and European Union (EU) member states. Moreover, turmoil in the Greater Middle East and North Africa is having a direct impact on Allied security. Terrorism remains a clear danger and technology is empowering individuals and small groups as adversaries capable of inflicting great harm or terror. These are not only short-term concerns, but long-term trends. Incorrect assumptions underpinning NATO’s strategy risk leading to policies inadequate to the challenges the Alliance faces.

Recognising this, NATO leaders began to respond to this profound change by rallying around an agenda of solidarity and responsibility at the Wales Summit. They adopted a Readiness Action Plan to bolster NATO’s collective defence capabilities and improve its response time. They signed up to a Defence Investment Pledge to halt and reverse the decrease in defence spending sapping Allied capabilities. And they embraced the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) providing the most capable and willing partners greater access to NATO business.

Since that Summit, NATO headquarters has focused on implementation of the Wales decisions, recognising that its credibility is directly linked to its ability to meet its commitments. In addition, Wales reinforced the enduring need for strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. In a spirit of complementarity, both organisations should consult and work together on a more frequent basis to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts.

Nonetheless, Allies acknowledge that Wales was only a first response. It reflected Allied solidarity by focusing on how to strengthen collective defence. In essence, the Wales’ agenda was about protecting our own. Therefore, NATO doctrine must address threats to Allies’ security from wherever they may originate. Today, it is clear that Allied populations and territory may not be secure as long as fires rage on their periphery, from Ukraine to Libya to Syria and Iraq, and as long as potential adversaries’ capabilities close the gap with our own.

The challenge looking forward to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit therefore is to build on Wales with a sense of urgency in the face of on-going crises, while using the Warsaw summit to advance a far-reaching transformation of the Alliance commensurate with this new security environment. NATO needs a strategy for the long-term reflecting the reality of today’s evolving challenges.

This necessity does not require a new Strategic Concept in the near-term as the core tasks of collective defence, cooperative security, and crisis management remain valid. But it does require recognition of the changed assumptions to NATO strategy, perhaps in clear statement in Warsaw, and an integration of these three core tasks into an effective strategy to protect Allies at home and project security and stability on its periphery, while being prepared for the unexpected.

The history of NATO is one of adaptation. We are entering the next chapter in this history as transformation remains a necessity.

To this end, the NATO Transformation Seminar was designed as a strategic, results-oriented brainstorming retreat. The deliberations helped inform preparations for NATO's 2016 Summit in Warsaw and provided the intellectual underpinnings for a rejuvenated strategy for NATO as it seeks to craft its responses to the crises in Europe's East and across the Middle East, a global power shift to the Asia-Pacific region, and an accelerated diffusion of power to non-state actors enabled by new, disruptive technologies. At the same time, Allies continued a frank consideration of both the future role of the United States and Canada in Europe, and European allies' resolve to assume a greater share of Alliance defence responsibilities.

Six key insights emerged from the Seminar, providing a potential agenda for NATO's on-going work in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit:

1. **NATO's Strategy.** Without reopening the Strategic Concept, a "strategic realignment" should be announced at the Warsaw summit to recognise the changed assumptions and adapt the Alliance's core tasks accordingly.
2. **Hybrid Warfare and Cyber security.** Russia and other adversaries will exploit vulnerabilities in and integration among our own societies necessitating a more comprehensive approach to Alliance security at home (not only in operations), including factors considered beyond the traditional purview of NATO.
3. **Innovation.** An innovation strategy is imperative for NATO. Innovation is an essential tool that the Alliance must leverage to catalyse investments, to enhance operational effectiveness, resilience, responsiveness, in order to open the gap between NATO and potential adversaries, and to sustain Allied interoperability.
4. **Strategic Awareness.** An enduring reform of information and intelligence sharing and collection is required as rapid collective responses require a better understanding of warnings before a crisis erupts.
5. **Readiness and Deterrence.** NATO forces must be able to react quickly and be stationed in ways that restore deterrence as a central tenant of Alliance strategy.
6. **Strengthening NATO's Partnerships.** Strategic implications of the crises in the East and South. NATO should develop a more coherent strategy of engagement toward strategic neighbours in the East and the South to bolster their security and capacities, as well as continuing to foster cooperation with the EU. A focused and resourced partnership initiative in conjunction and complementarity with the EU could serve as an aggregator and force-multiplier of current partnership tools and prioritise capacity-building efforts to help foster functional, capable nation states around NATO's borders.

These themes have implications for the preparations on the road to the Warsaw Summit, as well as for Allied Command Transformation's work. The following seminar report outlines these findings in more detail.

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Alliance prepares for its 2016 Summit in Warsaw at a time when the fundamental principles of the transatlantic community are under assault and Europe's security and stability is at its lowest since the end of the Cold War. NATO's borders are less secure in light of a newly assertive Russia potentially willing to turn to the use of force in the Euro-Atlantic

area, while on the other side of the Atlantic, the United States and Canada, contend with changes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as a revolution in energy production that may affect engagement in the Middle East. *Daesh's* barbarity and the state failure in the region pose a serious concern for allies. Terrorism remains a clear and present danger for all of NATO societies. Instability along Europe's southern and eastern borders, combined with a United States that seeks to balance competing pressures in the Middle East, Europe, and the Asia Pacific region, push NATO to innovate and adapt.

At the same time, the introduction and democratisation of new technologies means that power has been diffused to a wide array of non-state actors. While this diffusion of power is in many ways beneficial, it has also given rise to a new set of global security challenges, where states can use and combine new, hybrid means and methods to advance their interests and cause instability and political uncertainty across national borders, and sometimes back it up with conventional military means. Furthermore, in an environment of poor governance and failing states, non-state actors can now wield capacities and capabilities previously virtually reserved for states. Terror groups can also relatively easily achieve global reach, and attain enough critical mass to overwhelm weak states and institutions.

Continued defence cuts across the Alliance, combined with a significant boost in military spending by potential adversaries, constrict the allies' capacities to both adequately deter potential threats and act in response to aggression.

As NATO seeks to implement the decisions of the 2014 Wales summit and prepares for its next heads of state and government gathering in Warsaw, its strategy must take into account the fundamentally changed security landscape and adapt its strategic direction to reflect these shifts. By setting and achieving clear and actionable goals, the Alliance will boost its credibility, deterrence, and reinforcement of its collective defence guarantee.

NATO-EU cooperation underscores our common endeavours that include collective security and partnership. The scope of NATO-EU collaboration is broad and wide: from European Pooling and sharing, Framework Nations, regional groupings. NATO and EU efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach, deter hybrid threats together, combat cyber threats, and navigate challenges of a complex security environment. NATO and the EU work together to improve governance, increase the general resilience of countries, and therefore, also, reduce the vulnerability towards hybrid warfare.

SACT addressed three salient points with regard to multinational approaches to common challenges. First, nothing can replace the indispensable investments to stimulate participating nations and industry. Second, it takes time to refine the requirements and set the proper frameworks. Third, innovation offers a unique opportunity to transform and take the full benefit of the conjunction of new technologies, new concepts enabled by the connection of will and intellect.

NATO Transformation Seminar
Allied Command Transformation (ACT), in cooperation with the Atlantic Council, hosted the second annual NATO Transformation Seminar (NTS) in Washington, DC, from March 24-26, 2015. NTS brought together NATO's leadership and European and North American thought leaders, academics, and industry representatives for a strategic brainstorming to inform the Alliance's transformation agenda in the run up to the July 2016 Warsaw Summit and beyond.

KEY PRIORITIES

NATO'S STRATEGIC DIRECTION: The 2010 Strategic Concept does not sufficiently reflect today's geopolitical environment. However, it accurately captures the need for NATO to prepare for and execute all three core tasks of collective defence, cooperative security, and crisis management. In fact, the credibility of collective defence today relates to the Alliance's effectiveness at pursuing cooperative security in its neighbourhood, and its capacity to prevent, deter, and act when necessary in crises. While the Strategic Concept is sufficient to handle current and future challenges, the Alliance should intensify its work to reconsider how it organises, trains, and equips to execute the core task of collective defence; and how NATO integrates its approach to all three tasks in a single strategy to advance security.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding NATO's strategic direction could include:

- Demonstrate in a clear statement that Alliance leaders recognise the dramatically changed security landscape they face. Such a document would serve as a "strategic realignment" of the Strategic Concept to reflect the current challenges. The realignment could be articulated as a part of the communiqué or a separate political statement.
- Affirm that the three core tasks remain valid, but NATO's strategy will more consciously integrate them into a coordinated strategy.
- Confirm that NATO's security depends on its willingness and ability to help shape the security environment beyond its borders to decrease risk, often in conjunction with the EU.

HYBRID WARFARE AND CYBERSECURITY: Hybrid warfare is not new; it is as old as the Trojan Horse. Powers throughout history have confronted opponents that used an asymmetric combination of regular and irregular forces to negate the advantage of superior conventional military strength, reinforced by a principle of ambiguity in the modus operandi and the goals. Over the last decade, hybrid warfare re-emerged as a challenge for NATO; globalisation and the emergence of new and easily accessible technologies have magnified that challenge. As the Secretary General noted in his keynote address, "hybrid is the dark reflection of our comprehensive approach. We use a combination of military and non-military means to stabilize countries. Others use it to destabilize them."

Hybrid warfare and its supporting tactics can include broad, complex, adaptive, opportunistic, and often integrated combinations of conventional and unconventional methods. These activities can be overt or covert, involving military, paramilitary, organised criminal networks, and civilian actors across all elements of power. They often seek to sow confusion and ambiguity.

An adversary employing a hybrid strategy will likely exploit gaps among and between member nations and between them and NATO, and try to avoid thresholds of activities that would trigger application of Article 5. The Alliance should preserve the broad nature of Article 5 and develop options for collective defence measures under the threshold of Article 5.

The Secretary General further noted that, "to be prepared, we must be able to see and analyse correctly what is happening; to see the patterns behind events which appear isolated and random; and quickly identify who is behind and why." Countering hybrid threats requires that allies find common ground in formulating strategy that will allow the organisation to be nimble in

the face of diverse threats, with decision-making based on limited, imperfect information. NATO must have means to deploy its military and non-military assets in a high-threat environment on short notice. It should also have a plan for dealing with non-state, ideologically-driven actors that will not be susceptible to traditional concepts of deterrence.

Actors employing a hybrid strategy will aim for weak points in society and seek to undermine legitimate governance. Each hybrid threat is different, and so is each of the 28 nations' vulnerabilities. National governments are the first responders in the face of hybrid threats and have the capabilities to counter them with sensible policies in the area of minorities, energy, and economy. It remains an open question whether there could be deeper cooperation or integration between overall Alliance defence plans and the homeland security operations of the 28 allies. Allies could consider the merits of developing a process to parallel the NATO defence planning process and similar efforts in the EU in which allies develop resilience plans and submit them to peer review as a means to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities within allies that could impact other allies.

The overall goal is resilient societies, resilient militaries, and a resilient Alliance.

Engaging the Allies' populations in the process of defence against hybrid threats is a must, with obvious links to strategic communications. As SACT put simply, "our Alliance has to gain the battle of the narrative, through effective strategic communication." Public confidence in governance is a critical component. Therefore, the mind-set of defence must occur in social and political venues, as well as more traditional defence and security ones.

Most entities engaging in hybrid warfare push false or twisted narratives as part of information operations campaigns; the faster these can be countered with facts and clarity in messaging at senior political levels, the more quickly they can be exposed.

The Alliance must have identification capabilities to help with not just attribution, but in areas that remain national responsibilities. This suggests developing capabilities that can lead to faster attribution of activities to an identifiable entity, enabling a targeted and effective response. However, lack of iron-clad attribution should never mean a lack of action. NATO can serve as a force multiplier for sharing indicators and information about threat trends individual countries are observing.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding hybrid warfare could include:

- Approve a framework concept to comprehensively counter the hybrid threat, to include recommending a mechanism to integrate and align national defence and Alliance planning and resources into an overarching defence plan.
- Create a voluntary process to examine resilience and potential vulnerabilities among allies comparable to the defence planning process.
- Develop "full spectrum" approaches and policies that leverage the expertise and capabilities of other organisations. Convene informal working groups that bring NATO, EU, and OSCE experts together to coordinate approaches to warfare and the tools they can bring to bear individually and/or collectively to address threats of that nature.
- Design a strategic communications plan that integrates and coordinates messages across the 28 nations and, where appropriate, the EU a step beyond coordinating the messaging of only Alliance personnel.
- Establish a persistent strategic awareness and information fusion effort that is manned by, inter alia, cultural experts to provide immediate context to global events.

- Develop ways to insert clarity into hybrid operations where adversaries seek to maintain ambiguity. Counter ambiguity with open dialogue and discussion in the free press throughout the world. Foster discussion among national political leaders on need to speak plainly and clearly about adversaries who try to obfuscate their hostile activities.
- Use cyber as the bridging issue to better integrate Alliance planning and policies with the EU and U.S. domestic agencies, e.g., EUROPOL and U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding cybersecurity could include:

- Deliver on cyber enhancements agreed in Wales: increased resilience of Allied and NATO networks, information sharing, training, education and exercises, and closer engagement with Partner countries, international organisations, and industry.
- Adopt a NATO policy that, inter alia, reflects that cyber is a domain of hybrid warfare that requires a more agile Allied defence.
- Include cyber capability targets in the NATO Defence Planning Process.
- Continue operationalising the NATO-industry partnership; include industry in all cyber experiments and exercises.

INNOVATION: The Alliance's capacity to adapt, transform, and innovate has enabled NATO to remain the principal security guarantor for Europe for over sixty years. Keeping the military edge is paramount, especially given the increasingly rapid technological change that encompasses all areas of human endeavour. Yet, despite the attractiveness of breakthrough technologies, potential enemies will blend various approaches to war to embed them within cultures, historical legacies, geographic realities, and economic means. Against such adversaries, technological superiority is a key deterrent asset, but more than a simple techno-centric approach, a global innovation strategy is an imperative because innovation is the engine of Transformation. In addition, there is a need to innovate because changes are very fast.

The Secretary General underscored that, "we have to face the fact that we no longer have a monopoly on advanced technology within the Alliance. In Europe, few major programmes in cutting-edge capabilities are being launched, potentially degrading our long-term capabilities and our research and development base." The challenge for NATO and EU is, therefore, to minimise gaps between European and North American defence efforts, and within Europe, and to promote interoperability and open system architecture when and where possible. This is an organisational challenge as much as it is a technical one. It means maintaining a constructive dialogue among allied nations and providing NATO's leadership with the best advice for enabling innovation throughout the Alliance. Moreover, maximising the potential of innovation in the Alliance may mean bolstering and expanding partnership efforts with states, international entities, and the private sector.

We must innovate to help the Alliance adapt to the dramatic changes of the 21st Century and NATO has a solid foundation for this purpose—Science & Technology Organization and Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation)—but all the pieces must be connected. The main challenge is to translate innovation into nation-supported strategies that promote capabilities and adaptation that speed decision-making and our ability to respond. The Alliance no longer has a monopoly on advanced research and technology. In Europe, few major programmes in cutting-edge capabilities are being launched. This downturn in research and development potentially degrades our long-term capabilities. This trend corresponds to less demand, and accordingly, more and more companies shift resources from defence to the private sector. If this

trend continues, then we risk losing the skills and the research capacity NATO will need in responding to crises. To reverse this trend, we need resources and political will that come from nations.

The dynamism with which NATO has fulfilled its treaty obligations so far is in part a by-product of the investments allies have made in disruptive technological innovation for over a quarter century that have offset and deterred its adversaries' capabilities. But our advantage is eroding and the Secretary General acknowledges that NATO needs an innovation strategy for the future. To start, it would be useful for allies to define a framework that clarifies the need for NATO to innovate. The Alliance must recognise the bias against innovation in current practices, particularly in governments and military where risk tolerance is low. Up to a year ago, NATO was unpractised in a genuine crisis environment that had the potential to spill over its borders; this has allowed bureaucracy and low-risk tolerance to creep in and institutionalise itself in several spheres including: political decision-making, acquisition procedures, and project management.

The Alliance might consider delegating authority and improving accountability on programs, and bolstering cooperation with the EU. Industry and governments both lead innovation. The alliance/industry partnership must recognise and leverage this. How many of NATO's current operating practices should be revised? Must NATO innovate its thinking as well? Do we need a Tiger Team to foster innovation? Shall we promote collective innovation?

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding innovation could include:

- The recognition of Innovation through technology, cooperation, partnerships, and open-sharing information as part of the Alliance's cohesion and *raison d'être*.
- The development of a NATO innovation strategy, which could be translated into an innovation agenda, led by SACT, which might include direction to innovate NATO business practices, led by a NATO HQ element, with contribution from the NATO Agencies. NATO agencies are at the execution end of this spectrum and can bring significant added value to this process.
- A revised acquisition/project management policy, led by the NATO Office of Resources, which delegates authority, manages risk as opposed to eliminating it, and rewards quick delivery.
- Stronger relationship with industry by leveraging existing collaborative frameworks to capture industry best practice and innovative concepts applicable to NATO.
- Work with allies to strike a balance between looking for leap-frog technologies and cost-effective, highly usable platforms.
- More transatlantic Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) in technology.
- The U.S. Department of Defence to brief NATO allies on the Offset Strategy and open a debate on the potential implications – positive and negative – of such a strategy.
- Concrete incentives for nations to trigger investments:
 - Develop a stronger partnership with Industry in Cyber
 - Develop an open architecture approach for the replacement of structuring capabilities like the AWACS: transatlantic project, with fair return incentives for nations' industries, and leveraging open-architecture for interoperability and new concepts around the use of commercial technologies all across NATO countries.
- A NATO-EU roadmap as an expression of the imperative of partnership in Europe
- A stronger culture of exercises and early experimentations to continuously challenge and enhance our readiness and resilience up to the political level.

STRATEGIC AWARENESS: The Secretary General noted that NATO must be better at achieving a common understanding of both its allies and adversaries and that, “while political control and oversight is essential, it is crucial that we reconcile oversight with speed. We have done it before; we should be able to do it again.” Decision-making is based on sound intelligence. NATO intelligence sharing, or lack of thereof, has been traditionally one of the biggest challenges for the Alliance and its operations. Furthermore, it appears that knowledge and anticipation are the best answer to hybrid threats. As NATO builds its rapid reaction force, it will be crucial to improve mechanisms of intelligence sharing and establish new practices among the nation-states and EU. Enduring reform of intelligence sharing is needed to enhance joint ISR capabilities. The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC), which has been created with the sole purpose of providing intelligence to warn of potential crisis and to support the planning and execution of NATO operations, has been underutilised and needs to be transformed into an effective tool of intelligence sharing that remains outside of the national chains of command. As SACT observed, there is a permanent need to improve our strategic awareness through information sharing, joint intelligence, real time surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and the indispensable importance of the human domain. In looking into the future, reliable strategic awareness is not an option but a pre-requisite.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding strategic awareness could include:

- Better utilise and resource NIFC to increase the speed and intensity of sharing to better understand warnings that will help us prevent the crises before they happen.
- Call for a review of allied intelligence sharing procedures, in particular its Indication & Warnings System to shorten release times from days to hours. Call for proposals to further enhance maritime and air domain awareness in the spaces surrounding NATO, and the ability of NATO members to routinely share it with the Alliance, EU, and other NATO members.
- Convene interested, smaller groupings to draft Alliance assessments for specific regions and issues, including Russia, the Baltic Sea region, the broader Mediterranean, the Black Sea region, the High North, the Middle East and North Africa, unmanned systems, robotics, domain awareness technologies, and cyber. Those assessments could then be vetted and/or approved amongst a wider group of allies before being briefed to the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee.
- Design a standard program of sharing to protect against conventional and hybrid threats alike, directing each ally to identify potential military, economic, political, and societal vulnerabilities (and steps to be taken to mitigate them), and referencing Article 3 of the Washington Treaty to share best practices and Article 4 to utilise the Alliance’s consultation mechanism and develop capacity with law enforcement and other relevant bodies that may request it.

READINESS AND DETERRENCE: Russia’s multiple naval and airspace incursions in the Nordic-Baltic region and elsewhere have challenged NATO’s readiness and raised questions on whether NATO is properly positioned to respond to a potential, even if limited, Russian incident or incursion in the region. The Readiness Action Plan is an important stepping-stone to realign NATO’s military posture with the current realities. However, further measures need to be adopted. Moreover, our forces have to remain a first strategic shock absorber. In times of enduring budget constraints and pressing environment, we should coordinate; consolidate our

shared resilience through selected redundancy and measures of protection for critical infrastructure, decision making centres, networks, population and other centres of gravity.

NATO and the EU have responded in part to the Ukraine crisis with steps to reassure its eastern allies. The Alliance might consider framing its response as deterrence rather than reassurance to help focus Allied militaries on the purpose and mission of related deployments and the potential threat rather than potential allied insecurities. Furthermore, it is clear Allies will be facing a likely long-term set of challenges from Russia and could therefore consider means to sustain more substantial deployments in its eastern allies even as they examine NATO command structure and infrastructure decisions in a new security environment. They could also consider how to complement deterrence with a political dialogue with Russia.

NATO is a peaceful Alliance and must thus be able to deter. It is important to exercise NATO military and political decision-making processes and have a plan for improved crisis response decision-making for Warsaw. The effectiveness of collective deterrence is determined within the mind-set of the adversary. Therefore, NATO must make clear to its potential adversaries that the Alliance can also impose forbidding costs, deny military and political objectives, and build internal public resistance and resilience across the military and political domains.

Our forces need also to be highly agile, modular and trained in the full spectrum of warfare. NATO's legitimacy depends on its readiness and this readiness must be tested and evaluated. This is even more relevant in an era where lines are blurred to achieve strategic effects. Effective collective deterrence in an age of hybrid warfare also has economic, law enforcement, technical, and diplomatic components that fall outside of NATO's competencies and authorities, thereby placing a new urgency behind cooperation with national institutions and international and regional organisations. NATO might look at re-building the deterrence continuum from tactical to nuclear, taking into account the evolving requirements generated by hybrid warfare, and the changing nuclear doctrines among potential adversaries. To that end, NATO might review of its nuclear posture, with the results to be announced at the Warsaw summit.

Moreover, NATO needs more work to organise follow-on forces to enhance the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and to exercise other allied forces more frequently.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding readiness and deterrence:

- Update NATO readiness by an order of magnitude, not just incrementally, to reflect the new security environment.
- Announce a program to exercise the national political decision-making bodies of each of the 28 nations, designed to enhance the Alliance's ability to respond quickly and decisively to any threat. Integrate the first such exercise as part of the Warsaw Summit program.
- Exercise NATO full chain of Command and Control, including political decision making and tactical units.
- Assess the global coherence of forces availability, readiness, decision making and deployment.
- Focus resources on improving the deployability of forces. Prioritise the ability of forces to arrive on time and win decisively.
- Pursue an ambitious and robust exercise schedule, reflecting the diversity of NATO's missions and geostrategic environment.

- Develop common output-based measures that can give Alliance military leaders a better understanding of readiness across NATO. The same effort could also facilitate the sharing of best practices for achieving readiness standards most efficiently.
- Use the terms prevention/deterrence in place of reassurance to describe NATO strategy.
- Sustain NATO forces in eastern Allies until there is a significant change in the security environment.
- Consider amending command structure and infrastructure decisions to take into account the new security environment.
- Refresh NATO policy integrating nuclear forces into a deterrence framework.

**STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISES IN THE EAST AND SOUTH:
STRENGTHENING NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS**

The 2010 Strategic Concept correctly identifies that instability or conflict outside NATO's territory directly threatens the Alliance's security and stability. The current challenges unfolding beyond the Alliance and EU's borders in the East and the South pose a major threat for the Alliance, its credibility, and internal cohesion. In the East, Russia is attempting to reverse the outcome of the Cold War and gain influence over its immediate neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the nations that share the Mediterranean with Europe to the south and southeast are gripped with crises that threaten the security, stability, and prosperity of Europe.

First and foremost, these crises have underscored the importance of getting NATO's strategic partnership with the EU to work well. Both institutions have critical but complementary roles to play in these regions, and the nature of the challenges requires a comprehensive approach which only NATO and EU coordination can deliver. NATO should pursue a focused effort to operationalize this partnership in response to these challenges, including by seeking synergies between NATO defence capacity-building efforts and other EU capacity-building efforts in the East and the South. Achieving greater unity of purpose between NATO and the EU especially in their neighbourhoods is becoming a necessary, not just desirable, outcome.

Several of the participants noted the importance of partnerships and the need for a new state of mind for the cooperation with partners. SACT stated specifically that, our partners and the forces they bring to operations over the past decade have become part of NATO's DNA. We have to ensure the highest level of interoperability of these forces with our forces to enable them to take their full share in our Future Coalitions, and to cope with their own regional security. Wales advanced NATO partnerships significantly with the launch of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and its subsets the Interoperability Platform (IP) and Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) cohort. EOP, which has provided a welcomed mechanism to better involve NATO's most capable and willing partners – including key partners in Europe and the Middle East – in increasing aspects of NATO business. The Alliance should continue to expand the engagement opportunities available to these partners while also remaining open to welcoming additional interested and qualified partners into this mechanism. To demonstrate the value of the program, NATO might welcome greater partner leadership and ownership of key activities and initiatives. For example, NATO could actively support Jordan's plan for enhancing regional security.

At the same time, the changed geopolitical environment has called into question a core plank of NATO strategy: an open door policy to any European country in a position to undertake the

commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance has an opportunity to demonstrate the viability of the open door as it considers Montenegro's aspirations in preparation for Warsaw. At the same time, NATO must pursue a new partnership strategy that avoids an insecure grey zone emerging in the East in the absence of a consensus on further enlargement in the near-term.

The Wales decisions succeeded in affirming and boosting the Alliance's collective defence guarantee and assuring allies of NATO's steadfast commitment to their security. However, the Alliance cannot remain secure if its peripheries are touched by conflicts. Many institutions and actors, like the EU, play more significant roles than NATO in these regions. Nonetheless, in considering the challenges in the East and the South, NATO should move beyond securing its own borders and chart a unifying outreach strategy with two strategic effects:

- To deter existing and potential adversaries from further destabilising the Alliance's periphery and potentially disrupting and exploiting Alliance unity.
- To develop a more deliberate strategy to avoid a grey zone of insecurity and instability between the Allies and Russia in the East and further disruption of the fragile states of North Africa and the Middle East.

For the Alliance to support Nations and avoid permanent instability in its neighbourhood, which has direct bearings for NATO's own security, NATO needs a renewed partnership strategy engaging those strategic partners whose stability and security is critical to Euro Atlantic security. Such an initiative could aggregate and concentrate NATO's expansive partnership tools to prioritise their use. NATO's partnership activities beyond its borders must continue apace, mindful that regional security challenges—and the corresponding implications—are increasingly global. Furthermore, the modest and limited Defence Capacity Building Initiative could be transformed into a much more significant and smarter resourced tool giving the Alliance the ability to deploy substantial teams over long periods of time to help foster capable partners around NATO's borders which could also effectively serve as a deterrent.

The Alliance will also need to reconsider its partnership with Russia. Over the long-term, NATO should remain committed to its aspirations for a strategic partnership with a Russia willing to find its peaceful place in European security. However, in the current security situation, Russia poses a threat. In the near-term, NATO should temper its expectations for significant cooperation as it focuses on stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Any engagement with Russia should not compromise Allied security or values, but keep channels open to help prevent any incident occurring as a result of aggressive Russian manoeuvres, to manage any crisis if one were to develop, and to leave the door open if Russia decides to rein in its aggressive actions.

Potential deliverables in the run-up or at Warsaw regarding NATO's partnerships and response to crises in the east and south might include:

- Acknowledge that the instability of nations in the Euro Atlantic area beyond NATO's borders have direct bearing for NATO's own security.
- Forge a coordinated comprehensive approach to the East and South between NATO and the EU, leveraging each institution's relative strengths.
- Maximise the integration of enhanced partners into NATO business and activities, while welcoming new qualified partners into the EOP.
- Make clear that NATO's open door policy remains viable and credible; seek consensus on inviting Montenegro to join the Alliance.
- Forge a new Warsaw strategic partnership initiative aimed at using NATO's cooperative security approach to extend stability and security to key, vulnerable neighbors.

- Prioritise the use of NATO partnership tools with these strategic partners as part of this initiative and dramatically enhance and resource the Defence Capacity Building initiative.
- Develop a new approach designed to deter Russian aggression, while keeping communication channels open to help prevent or manage any incidents.
- Commission a senior group to develop a strategy toward states in Europe's East to bolster their sovereignty and to address their aspirations where applicable for membership.