



ITALIAN
ATLANTIC COMMITTEE

Strategic Concept
Working Group

Interim Discussion Paper

NATO NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT



Securing our Future
••• 1949 - 2009 •••
Garantir l'avenir de notre sécurité

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Interim Discussion Paper

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NEW STRATEGIC
CONCEPT

November 2009

With this paper the Italian Atlantic Committee initiates a series entitled Atlantic Studies in order to promote awareness and debate on the most current relevant foreign affairs, security and economic issues regarding the Atlantic Alliance.

In this perspective, the present study on the new Strategic Concept aims to offer a contribution to the debate launched by the Atlantic Alliance on the development of the new NATO Strategic Concept.

This paper gathers the insights acquired by the Strategic Concept Working Group following a protracted and deep study that has involved representative personalities of the political, military, diplomatic, and academic field as well as national and foreign research centers.

Such a process reflects the essence of the Italian Atlantic Committee whose mission entails the promotion of the fundamental values and tasks of our Alliance within various sectors of civil society.

[On. Prof. Enrico La Loggia](#)

President of the Italian Atlantic Committee

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*The index focuses on issues requiring consideration
without aiming to amend the current Strategic Concept*

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The most important document, periodically revised by NATO, is its Strategic Concept. Indeed, it is a mind-boggling task, as the concept should: (1) Include the clear delineation of the situation; (2) Reaffirm the Alliance’s collective identity; (3) Spell out the aims and the strategic objectives; (4) Provide a preliminary indication of the approaches to be followed. As Nations’ vital interests are therefore affected, all Allies strive to have them inserted into the Concept.

The very first document of this kind was issued the 1 December 1949, after having been submitted to the Defence Committee with the telling title of “Revised Strategic Concept”, as already two iterations had been carried out.

Therefore, a good start for a new document is to take a look at the previous document, to see what needs to be changed and what is still relevant, in the ever-changing world scenario.

The first issue to be addressed concerns the Alliance “raison d’être”. In this respect, the NATO Strategic Concept issued in 1999 at paragraph 65 states:

“The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements [...]”.

Since then several events occurred, starting with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, followed by others in London, Madrid, and Istanbul. The rising world tension and the events of the first decade of the XXI century profoundly changed the strategic environment, thus calling for a further revision of the NATO strategic approach, to adapt itself to effectively meet the new threats, the growing risks and the multifaceted challenges experienced.

The Alliance has foreseen this necessity at the 1999 Washington Summit when the Strategic Concept was adopted, by stating that “it [...] will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment” (para 65). The Prague Summit Declaration (2002), the Istanbul Summit Communiqué (2004), the Riga Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006), and the Bucharest Summit Declaration (2008) projected the Alliance into a new security scenario and paved the way for a revision of the Strategic Concept.

Most recently, the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration together with the Declaration on Alliance Security (3-4 April 2009) provided the conceptual and procedural background for a new Strategic Concept, setting also forth that it will be developed and adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2010.

In this perspective, the Italian Atlantic Committee set up, already in September 2008, a Strategic Concept Working Group (SCWG) to offer a national contribution to the current debate launched by the Alliance on the new Strategic Concept. The SCWG has submitted the following paper, where a number of new key issues and challenges are indicated and those parts of the previous Strategic Concept that should be revised are highlighted. Although the work of the SCWG is not an independent rewriting of the Concept itself, it rather aims at facilitating the decision-makers within the Alliance, so that they may consider all the relevant aspects and implications throughout the negotiating process leading to the new NATO Strategic Concept.

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Coordinator of the Strategic Concept Working Group

PART ONE

PURPOSE AND TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE

As a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO started a “*transformation*” process in order to meet the changes occurring in the international security environment. The “*transformation*” affected the military as much as the political dimension, bringing about significant adjustments to NATO command structure, its forces and capabilities. Moreover, it impacted Alliance Partnerships and, more importantly, the perception of the Alliance’s role in the new international scenario.

In addition, NATO’s enlargement implies a stronger and renewed commitment to the values and principles upon which the political dimension of the Alliance was founded on 4 April 1949.

Therefore, the NATO new Strategic Concept should particularly focus on three issues: (1) The strengthening of the Transatlantic Link, the very political essence of the Alliance; (2) The utmost importance of the consultation procedures among the Allies over common security issues; (3) The relevance of Article 5 as NATO core business, to be complemented by an enhanced attention to Article 4 with reference to the emerging vital issues such as energy security and cyber defense.

1. Transatlantic Link

- The Transatlantic Link is the political essence of NATO, as the Alliance rests on the active synergy between both sides of the Ocean;
- This link implies common values, shared vision and commitments, mutual understanding and a fair burden-sharing among all Members;
- After 60 years and in an enlarged Alliance, the Transatlantic Link represents more than an essential “Approach to Security” – as considered in the 1999 Strategic Concept¹ – and became itself a core NATO value to be strengthened and preserved;
- Therefore, the Transatlantic Link should be listed in Part I of the new Strategic Concept, among the Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance.

1. Part III of the 1999 Strategic Concept.

2. Articles 4 and 5 Today

- Articles 4 and 5 are the bedrock upon which the security of the Alliance is based;
- The spirit of solidarity, the consultation and cooperation inherent to these articles, should be effectively reflected in all NATO-led operations which are subject to the consensus of Members on the aim and approach to be followed;
- In the light of the emerging new threats and future security challenges, the role of Article 4 might be enhanced in a spirit of solidarity, mutual assistance and cooperation based also on the precedent of NATO's Operation Display Deterrence.

PART TWO

NEW SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES

The 1999 Strategic Concept still considers terrorism as a “*risk*” (PARA. 24) and not yet as a threat. Therefore, the notion of terrorism must be revised in order to make it more coherent with the real nature of the threat, as it has already been laid out both in the NATO *Defense against Terrorism* (DAT) program and the Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism, which were adopted by the Alliance shortly after the Washington and New York terrorist acts.

Paragraph 24 of the 1999 Strategic Concept – the same paragraph mentioning terrorism – considers the possibility of a “*disruption of the flow of vital resources*”. Energy security is a vital interest of the Alliance and NATO can and should have a greater role in safeguarding energy resources by protecting transport and transfer flow as well as the critical infrastructures in the energy sector.

Maritime security is an important step to face security challenges for the Alliance. Illegal immigration, human and drugs trafficking, weapons smuggling, piracy, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery are plaguing the world's oceans and seas. Therefore, NATO is required to perform an ever more active role in guaranteeing maritime security. The new Strategic Concept should foresee the right by NATO to: (1) Act along the sea lanes of vital interests for the Alliance; (2) Protect critical infrastructures, including oil and natural gas off-shore platforms; (3) Enhance maritime security with respect to the surveillance of shipping lanes, port facilities and choke points, intelligence gathering and information exchange.

Global warming is another major challenge NATO is expected to deal with in the XXI century. In the current Strategic Concept there are no specific indications over it, even if the conclusion states that “*as the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century*” (para 65). Global warming could result in: (1) Growing scarcity of water and food; (2) Spread of infectious diseases; (3) Migration of millions of people; (4) Melting of the polar ice caps, with the risk of a generalized rise of the sea level. Moreover, the possibility to increasingly exploit the resources in the Arctic regions, as well as the opportunities afforded by a commercial use of the North-East and North-West passages poses new political problems.

Cyber Defense, too, is not explicitly taken into account in the 1999 Strategic Concept, even if paragraph 23 draws attention to the case that “*state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weaponry*”. A specific *Cyber Defense Policy*, aimed at impeding the success of any aggression against defense-related systems of the Member countries has been adopted at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, thus needing to be taken into account in the new Strategic Concept. Inter-Allied solidarity and mutual assistance, in case of cyber attacks, should be contemplated as well.

Space is another issue the NATO new Strategic Concept should include among the future challenges. The subject is not mentioned within the 1999 Strategic Concept, but it gained increased relevance in recent years. Space is strictly connected to antimissile defense and, more generally, to nuclear weaponry issues. NATO new Strategic Concept should look closely at international developments and include the option of taking the required defensive measures in case of any hostile use of Space against either the Alliance or one its Members.

1. Terrorism

- In the fight against terrorism, NATO has shown its determination and cohesion;
- NATO seeks peace, and while deterring intimidation or aggression against the Alliance and its Members intends to contribute to extended stability, respect of human rights and welfare according to the principles of the United Nations and by promoting a comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism.

2. Cyber Defense

- NATO will undertake every measure required to ensure that no cyber aggression against its structures, networks and operations will succeed;
- NATO will assist all Members and Partners, should their defense-related networks be attacked.

3. Energy Security

- The unimpeded flow of energy is among the vital interests of the Members of the Alliance;
- The protection of key infrastructures for energy extraction, processing and distribution constitutes a common good;

- Mutual assistance among Members and Partners in the defense of these infrastructures will foster cohesion and collective resolve.

4. Maritime Security

- Freedom of the seas cannot imply widespread lawlessness;
- There can be no security without legality, and no legality without oversight. Therefore, NATO reserves its right to act along the sea lanes of vital concern to the Alliance;
- These maritime operations represent an ideal field for cooperation with others International Organizations and Partners sharing the same concern.

5. Global Warming

- Global Warming is a shared concern among all NATO Members;
- NATO is willing to cooperate with other International Organizations and Partners to mitigate its effects and to assist and provide relief to those who may be the most affected.

6. Space

- NATO pledges never to deploy weapons in Space, and to use them only for defensive activities;
- Any use of Space for hostile purposes, against either the Alliance or one of its Members, will be duly countered through the appropriate defensive measures.

PART THREE

MEMBERSHIP, PARTNERSHIPS AND RELATIONS

The current Strategic Concept states that “*through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area*” (para 33).

From being a static Alliance, during the Cold War, NATO became part of an ‘*Interlocking Institutions*’ system, where the Alliance is called upon to provide an added value in security sectors and in cooperation with other International Organizations, first and foremost the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the OSCE.

Partnership for Peace program has been the principal mechanism for forging security dialogue and enhancing interoperability between the Alliance and its Partners. The word ‘Dialogue’ is already used 13 times in the 1999 Strategic Concept either generically or for a more specific approach, as mentioned in the case of the Mediterranean Dialogue, considered to be fundamental for the European security system.

NATO partnerships have significantly evolved since 1999, along with NATO presence in several theatres, including the Balkans, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Darfur and the Middle East. Partners are currently participating to NATO-led operations, notwithstanding the existing limitations in the exchange of tactical information. A new Cooperation Initiative have been developed with Gulf Countries at the 2004 Istanbul Summit and closer relations in operation have been established with like-minded ‘Contact Countries’.

Moreover, the opportunity to develop closer relations with other Regional Organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union (AU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Arab League, is emerging in conjunction with increased Alliance activities and global threats.

NATO – EU partnership appears crucial, as it will be matched with the level of ambition of the two organizations and their degree of cooperation. The reform of the European Security and Defense Policy brought forward by the Lisbon Treaty will require an update in the bilateral relations that should bring about an enhancement of the cooperation, in order to widen its spectrum, now limited to the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. To this end, both Organizations should define their level of ambition as well as a better coordination between their respective capabilities development processes.

The “open door” policy is already clearly stated by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and is still nowadays the consolidated NATO approach towards other European countries.

Within this framework, Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security, as “*a strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area*” (para 36). The new threats and challenges requires constant dialogue and cooperation with the Russian Federation that might proved to beneficial also on issues not considered in the current Strategic Concept.

Wherever there are similar strategic interests, the cooperation between NATO and Russia might prove extremely beneficial to both.

1. Interlocking Institutions System²

- NATO reaffirms its determination to respect and promote the principles of international law, as well as the Charter of the United Nations;
- The Alliance is willing to cooperate with others International Organizations in pursuance of shared goals and objectives;
- This willingness shall not preclude nor constrain any action in application of its founding Treaty.

2. NATO – United Nations

- NATO acknowledges the primary role and responsibility of the United Nations (UN) in ensuring and fostering international peace and security;
- NATO cooperates with the UN in pursuance of shared goals;
- In domains where NATO expertise and capabilities are useful, NATO structures and assets are ready to assist the UN in field operations and training.

3. NATO – European Union

- NATO encourages a growing European Union (EU) role in fostering peace and stability in areas of mutual interest;
- Taking into consideration that 21 NATO countries are also EU members, and that only a single set of forces is available, unnecessary duplications must be avoided particularly in areas of force planning, capability development and operations, where coordination and synergies may prove to be essential;

2. The Interlocking Institutions system, stated in the Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in November 1991, represents the bedrock of the Comprehensive Approach recalled during the Summits of Riga 2006 and Bucharest 2008, Strasbourg-Kehl 2009, in order to meet the new multifaceted security challenges of the XXI century.

- Combining specific NATO and EU capabilities is of paramount relevance to foster an effective ‘Comprehensive Approach’ for stabilization and reconstruction as well as to develop a NATO – EU strategic partnership;
- To this scope, arrangements supplementing the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement might be fundamental.

4. Cooperation with Other Regional Organizations

- Building on the existing longstanding relations with the UN, the EU and with other International Organizations, NATO is keen to meet the requests for increased cooperation coming from other Regional and Sub-regional Organizations sharing its goals and objectives, in a spirit of mutual respect;
- The Alliance is also ready to welcome any structured liaison and dialogue with these organizations to foster coordination and create synergies in areas of mutual concern.

5. Shanghai Cooperation Organization

- The stability of Asia calls for a constructive dialogue with those Regional Organizations, and in particular with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in this domain.

6. NATO – Russia

- NATO promotes increasing consultation and cooperation with Russia within the agreed framework and the existing common bodies;
- The ultimate goal of the NATO – Russia cooperation is to improve stability and cooperative security in all areas of mutual concern;
- NATO believes that its special partnership with Russia has a strategic value, not only with respect to the fight against terrorism, but also with respect to other aspects, namely energy security and global warming, to include its potential geopolitical consequences.

7. Enlargement

- Doors are open for the Membership of every European country who shares the same values and meets the conditions necessary to contribute to the common aims;

- European nations willing to become NATO member must:
 - Undertake the commitments outlined in the Alliance Treaty;
 - Adopt systems of government, practices and laws compliant with the principles and the procedures of the Alliance;
 - Commit themselves to participate in the collective security system as contributors to overall stability within their means and capabilities.

8. Privileged Partners

- Nations sharing the same values can become NATO Privileged Partners and enjoy NATO assistance and cooperation to build-up their defense structures;
- Privileged Partners will be consulted regularly about major problems of mutual concern;
- Privileged Partners participating in NATO-led operations will be involved into the decision-making politico-military process, and will receive relevant information.

9. Contact Countries

- Global threats and challenges and the worldwide growing commitments of NATO, call for a structured cooperation with those nations sharing the same principles, values and aims;
- Partners participating in NATO-led operations and initiatives will be appropriately consulted during the decision-making process;
- They can also be provided with all required field information.

10. NATO and the Mediterranean

- The Mediterranean Sea is an area of vital interest for the security of the Alliance;
- NATO will contribute to make the Mediterranean Sea an area of cooperation among riparian countries, promoting peace and licit trade;
- Therefore, NATO welcomes the progress made by the Mediterranean Dialogue, in the framework of which very fruitful meetings have been held both at level of Foreign Ministers and of Defense Ministers. In the same vein, also the practical cooperation has witnessed very encouraging achievements;
- NATO is also willing to assist Mediterranean Dialogue nations in the effort to improve their security and military capabilities in pursuance of shared goals and objectives.

11. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

- NATO promotes peace and stability in the Gulf area and confirms its availability to keep the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) as a partnership process open to all countries of the area willing to cooperate;
- NATO welcomes the ICI countries and reaffirm its will to assist them in the development of the capabilities identified in the relevant protocols.

PART FOUR

OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

Protecting Alliance values and territorial integrity from external threats remains the NATO's core mission.

According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO combined military forces are called upon to deter any potential aggression, to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations, as stated in the section dedicated to the Principles of Alliance Strategy.

The document also reaffirmed that *“the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level”* (para 46).

Even in the present rapidly changing security environment, similar capabilities are still necessary, while NATO is required to transform and adapt to the evolving strategic priorities and military needs, taking into account existing financial constraints.

The revision of the present nuclear policy, already ongoing, should be reflected in the new Concept.

Expansion in NATO operations has grown. Therefore, more effective, balanced, and interoperable capabilities are necessary to carry out the full range of missions and to meet the threats and challenges of the XXI century, including international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, cyberattacks, energy security and climate change.

ISAF is the most demanding mission the Alliance has ever undertaken. The implications for NATO are new and vast, ranging from the different national caveats to the need of an effective civilian-military cooperation, also with regard to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’ does not always comply with the highest degree of solidarity among Members. This is particularly true when not all Member countries participate to missions, but they hold the same decision power over them.

The new Strategic Concept has to address the abovementioned issues and its potential implications for Alliance solidarity, operations and interoperability.

1. Transformation

- Transformation is essential to keep NATO forces and capabilities adequate to the challenges of the new security scenario;
- Common development of new concepts and capabilities is the most effective way to keep NATO forces relevant and able to face new threats and ensure collective security.

2. Decision-making Process

- Over the last sixty years, the principle of *consensus* has ensured the Alliance's cohesion and political strength to NATO's action;
- The *consensus* principle needs to be adapted to the threats, challenges and emergencies of the present times, which are spreading rapidly and call for a quick action;
- Appropriate procedures should be agreed to preserve a responsive and effective Alliance.

3. Afghanistan

- The Alliance is determined to make Afghanistan a prosperous and self-sustaining nation, able to contribute to the stability of the region;
- NATO strives to reduce differences in operational approach among Member countries minimizing national caveats;
- NATO Members endeavor to reduce national caveats that may result in constraints in the conduct of operations;
- NATO condemns the abuse and exploitation of civilian population in operations and endeavors to avoid civilian casualties;
- NATO Members will consider ways to improve the reconstruction activities in order to avoid duplications and inefficiencies.

4. Financing Operations

- Crises Response Operations (CROs) are the core activities of NATO, in its collective effort to improve peace and stability in the most troubled areas of vital interest;
- Even if committing forces to operations is subject to the political will of each Member, the praxis of '*costs lie where they fall*' for operations decided through *consensus* is in contradiction with the principle of fair burden-sharing;
- NATO Members will therefore strive to mitigate such inequalities, wherever possible, in a spirit of solidarity.

5. NATO Response Force

- NATO Response Force (NRF) is the principal asset enabling the Alliance to face the unforeseen, in an increasingly troubled world;
- NRF represents also a catalyst for NATO's Transformation, as it allows the build-up of a modern, joint, synergic and integrated military instrument;
- However, force commitment for NRF cannot jeopardize current NATO operations, and should not result in an unsustainable burden for NATO nations;
- Therefore, a flexible approach to NRF must be considered by the Alliance.

6. Nuclear Forces

- In a troubled world, the nuclear deterrent remains the indispensable support for NATO conventional forces when facing serious dangers;
- However, it is inevitable that the nuclear posture be considered afresh on the basis of agreed criteria, in order to ensure its continued relevance in our era with special mention to its connections with the vitality of the Transatlantic Link.

7. Collective Capabilities

- NATO Collective capabilities are an essential force-multiplier for the effective conduct of operations;
- Their build-up, with the participation of Alliance Members, is the best way to contain national expenditures and to achieve the required economies of scale;
- Nations who contribute to them financially and provide manpower are entitled to use them according to the modalities established by proper NATO bodies.

8. Missile Defense

- A NATO collective capability to thwart any threat of ballistic missiles against its territory, populations and its deployed forces is a key factor of dissuasion;
- Initiatives undertaken so far both by the Alliance and Members deserve to be linked establishing a coherent defensive shield;
- Such an initiative should not be perceived as a threat. The efforts to prevent such perception should be an essential part of the missile defense related program.

ATTACHMENTS

9. Intelligence

- Intelligence is the essential support to NATO's decision-making process, as well as the key enabler for its operations;
- Intelligence sharing among Members is a powerful indicator of mutual solidarity;
- NATO will undertake the fusion of the information provided by Members at the Alliance and Regional levels and will circulate the product for the benefit of all and through appropriate procedures;
- Intelligence distribution will be made in full respect for the caveats required by the Member providing the most sensitive information, in order to safeguard the sources.

10. Training

- Cohesion between staffs and forces in the field is a vital requirement;
- This goal has been achieved, so far, through agreed standards, procedures, inspections and evaluations, duly supplemented by NATO-led exercises and training programs;
- NATO has undertaken training in some key, albeit limited, areas where synergy of efforts was particularly rewarding;
- However, NATO Members are aware that the present standards need to be upgraded in order to improve the effectiveness of staffs and operations alike;
- NATO can cooperate with other relevant International Organizations (UN, OSCE, AU,...) offering its added value in the training of international peace-keepers.

11. Public Diplomacy

- In the current global security scenario, NATO's operations are increasingly taking place beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and might not involve the public opinion enough, not only because they take place in geographically remote regions;
- Thus, a correct and timing information is essential to foster the support of the public opinion and decision makers and must complement NATO's missions and policies;
- However, while the Strategic Concept should be fully understandable by a wider audience it should not necessarily become a public diplomacy document only.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C., April 4th 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6¹

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France², on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations,

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.³

3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

*Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Washington D.C. 24 April 1999*

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.
2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.
3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must

deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.

5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

Part I The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.
7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.
8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.
9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.
10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Wash-

ington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

Part II Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, co-operation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its com-

mitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.
14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.
15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.
17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.
18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order

to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.

19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.
21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.
22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces.

Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.
24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III

The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and

stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance Of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.
29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security And Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and

when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

Conflict Prevention And Crisis Management

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peace-keeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.
32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance's political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.
34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.
35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic

prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.

38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that—as an important part of its broad approach to security-defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces Principles Of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO's military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.
42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.
43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key features include

collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO's Partners in such arrangements or the development of similar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.

44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.
45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.
46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and-in case of conflict-to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.
48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a

distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.

49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.
50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance's fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies' forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.
52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response op-

erations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory. The characteristics of the Alliance's forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:

- a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;
- b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;
- c. that NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;
- d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;
- e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force

elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

- f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;
- g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;
- h. that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;
- i. that the Alliance's forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

54. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case — but very remote — scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.
56. The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.
57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.
58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.
59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no

host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.

60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.
61. The Alliance's ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, *inter alia* through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-armed forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

Part V Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

DECLARATION ON ALLIANCE SECURITY

Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg
Kehl on 4 April 2009

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts.

NATO's enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respond quickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crises emerge. We must also reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effective organization. We will strengthen NATO's capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach

to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. In Afghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.

NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the European Union's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which their fullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement our vision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value the support that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.

We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today's threats and to anticipate tomorrow's risks. United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process.

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