According to analysts, the war between Russia and Ukraine may paradoxically serve to strengthen NATO. One of the expected outcomes of the Eastern European conflict is a surge in integration and a greater role for European nations within the Alliance. Sensing the relevance of the topic and the growing public interest, the Hungarian Atlantic Council organized an online discussion via Zoom on the decisions made at the NATO Madrid Summit.
The speaker was Professor Zoltán Szenes, retired General and President of the Hungarian Association of Military Science. The event was hosted by György Csóti, President of the Hungarian Atlantic Council, with General Lajos Fodor (ret.), Vice President of the Council, moderating the evening.
Following introductory remarks and the speaker’s presentation, participants were treated to a detailed yet accessible analysis of NATO’s new Strategic Concept.
Professor Szenes explained that the new Strategic Concept was one of the major outcomes of NATO’s 2022 Madrid Summit. Other decisions included adopting a new force model, committing to long-term support for Ukraine, and inviting Sweden and Finland to join the Alliance. NATO also resolved to strengthen cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners, reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 45% by 2030 (a topic particularly important to U.S. President Joe Biden), establish a NATO Innovation Fund, and increase internal financing. It was also announced that the next NATO Summit would take place in Vilnius in 2023.
To date, NATO has adopted eight Strategic Concepts, all of which were previously classified. Fortunately, they are now accessible in the Alliance’s archives. Interestingly, Szenes noted that the 1957 deterrence strategy remains relevant today. “The Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose, the character of the Alliance, and its core security tasks,” he emphasized. Beyond evaluating the strategic environment, the document also guides force transformation and addresses new challenges including China, critical infrastructure protection, technological competition, and human security.
A striking political element in the new document is its reference to the “Russian Federation” — not just “Russia” — signaling a deliberate shift. The document’s primary goal is deterrence, and NATO’s new force model shifts from “Forward Presence” to “Forward Defense.” The model envisions a 1.5 million-strong force, of which 100,000 troops can be mobilized within 10 days, 200,000 in 20 days, and 300,000 in 30 days. This is supported by NATO’s “iron-clad” commitment under Article 5 of its founding treaty. The goal is clear: ensure Ukraine’s victory and deter Russian aggression. NATO hasn’t envisioned such a large force since the 1952 Lisbon Summit.
Szenes presented a visual summary of the strategic shock that triggered the current planning cycle.
The presentation concluded with a Q&A session. One question focused on the role of the Czech Republic, which — despite its leadership role — is not a “flank country” geographically, similar to Germany. Responding to another question, Szenes noted that the war in Ukraine has entered its third phase.
He pointed out that the West’s technological superiority has matured, exemplified by Ukraine’s effective use of HIMARS rocket systems, which have disrupted Russia’s already fragile logistics. He introduced the term “bridge war” to describe the significance of Ukraine’s rivers and how Russia relies heavily on rail logistics for deployment and resupply.
On migration, Szenes acknowledged it as a security threat addressed in NATO documents, but emphasized that its resolution is not feasible through military means.
He concluded by noting that NATO’s steps should not provoke disproportionate responses from Russia, as the Alliance’s actions are aimed at defense, not escalation.
