Alongside diplomacy and military operations, economic sanctions represent the third key domain of interaction among states. Despite this, relatively few Hungarian-language studies have examined the analytical methodology of economic warfare, which includes the use of sanctions. The purpose of this paper is to present the main analytical perspectives and mechanisms of effect in this field.
Drawing on a broad international literature and case studies, the paper discusses the types of economic warfare, interprets asymmetry and interdependence in these contexts, explores the relationship between internal decision-making processes and sanction outcomes, and outlines the defining features of major powers’ sanction policies. Finally, it introduces the key criteria by which the success or failure of a particular measure can be evaluated.
The study primarily aims to serve educational and knowledge-expanding purposes. At the same time, the author hopes it will also contribute to a more nuanced understanding of economic warfare, offering a more differentiated view in contrast to often oversimplified professional opinions, while addressing the “sanctions skepticism” found even in Western academic discourse and helping analysts avoid the extremes often characteristic of thinking in this field.
