On May 18, 2022, Sweden and Finland officially submitted their applications to join NATO. However, Turkey indicated that it would support the accession of the two Nordic countries only under certain conditions. Two central demands emerged from the Turkish side: a stricter stance on counterterrorism and the lifting of arms export bans imposed on Turkey.
On June 28, during the first day of the NATO summit in Madrid, an agreement was reached among the three countries, leading Ankara to vote in favor of initiating accession talks. The process of admitting the two new members advanced swiftly in the shadow of the Russia–Ukraine war: accession negotiations concluded on July 4, and on July 5, the accession protocols were signed by representatives of the member states.
Nevertheless, Turkey could still theoretically block the process, as the accession protocol must be ratified by all thirty NATO member states. On June 30, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Stockholm and Helsinki must first “fulfill their promises”; otherwise, the protocol would not reach the Turkish parliament. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was scheduled to be in summer recess until October 1. Additionally, tactical considerations may contribute to Ankara’s potential delay in ratification.
This study explores the roots of the conflict between Turkey and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Finland. It focuses on the differing interpretations of terrorism by Turkey and its Western allies, as well as the resulting tensions. The analysis also highlights that the Kurdish issue/terrorism issue is likely to remain a source of similar conflicts within NATO in the future, unless perceptions and/or positions begin to converge.
